Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or disappear at any period. Moreover, convergence to an efficient network is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. We propose the link-based allocation rule for such dynamic random network formation processes and provide its axiomatic characterization. By considering a monotone game and a particular (natural) network formation process we recover the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a).
Introduction 1.Aim of the paper
Interactions can be naturally modeled by networks, and consequently, successfully studied with the support of network theory. Interacting individuals can be viewed as players that are linked in a network and contribute to a total productive value or utility of the network. One of the key questions in a cooperative setting is how to divide the value generated by the network between the players. It means defining an allocation rule that will specify for each member his share of the value of the network. Different proposals concerning this topic, and both cooperative and non-cooperative foundations of network allocation rules, have been presented in the literature. For surveys of the vast literature on the issues we refer, e.g., to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) , Dutta and Jackson (2003) , van den Nouweland (2005) , Jackson (2005b Jackson ( , 2008 . Also some of the more recent works that will be mentioned in this section provide (short) surveys of different allocation rules. where the value generated depends directly on the network structure, and showed that the Myerson value has a direct extension from communication games to network games. They defined the egalitarian allocation rule and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. In this framework, benefits and costs of forming links are assumed and the focus is on pairwise stable and efficient networks. For the potential conflict between stability and efficiency of networks, see, e.g., Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Dutta and Jackson (2000) . Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) considered the strongly stable networks, i.e., networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of players. Caulier et al. (2013) showed how efficiency and stability can be reconciled in a setting where players are organized in a network and a coalitional structure. They developed the notion of contractually stable networks where the consent of coalitional partners is needed in order to modify the structure. Slikker (2007) characterized axiomatically the Myerson value, the position value and the component-wise egalitarian solution, and also proposed three non-cooperative bargaining procedures that result in the same payoffs as the three rules. For other works concerning non-cooperative foundations of allocation rules, we should mention, e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) who presented an implementation of the Shapley value, and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2005) who described a mechanism that ends in the Myerson value of the monotonic cover of the value function. Caulier (2010) considered a rule that provides payoffs to links, where these payoffs are then divided equally over players. He followed Shapley's characterization for this allocation procedure to the links. The weighted Shapley values defined by Kalai and Samet (1987) was generalized to communication situations in Haeringer (1999) and to hierarchical structures in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000a) . van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) characterized the position value for network situations where no condition on the underlying network is required. Ghintran (2013) generalized the position value by taking into account the negotiation powers of players on the allocation of the worth. She characterized this new weighted position value for communication situations with cyclefree networks. For a similar approach, see also, e.g., Haeringer (2006) who considered allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Ghintran et al. (2012) generalized the position value defined for the class of deterministic communication situations, to the class of generalized probabilistic communication situations, and provided two characterizations of this allocation rule.
Although there exists the vast literature on modeling interactions by social and economic networks, the issue of network dynamics has still not received enough attention. Some examples of the dynamic approach to interactions are presented, e.g., in some extensions of the Jackson-Wolinsky connections model to a dynamic framework; see e.g., Jackson and Watts (2002) , Watts (2001 Watts ( , 2002 . Konishi and Ray (2003) considered a dynamic model of coalition formation when players are farsighted. A model of dynamic network formation with farsighted players was studied by Dutta et al. (2005) . They defined a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of players and allows for limited cooperation amongst them. Page et al. (2005) introduced a dynamic framework of network formation and analyzed farsightedly consistent directed networks. They studied the notion of a supernetwork which is a collection of directed networks and represents coalitional preferences and rules governing network formation. Page and Wooders (2009) introduced a model of network formation with a set of feasible networks, player preferences, rules of network formation and a dominance relation on feasible networks. The authors characterized sets of network outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist. Also Herings et al. (2009) addressed the question which networks one might expect to emerge in the long run when players are farsighted. They provided a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Page and Wooders (2007) modeled club structures as bipartite networks and formulated the problem of club formation as a game of network formation. They identified club networks that are stable if players are farsighted, and club networks that are stable if players are myopic. Page and Wooders (2010) formulated club formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network formation and identified conditions sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function.
Despite the growing literature on dynamic networks, most allocation rules for network games assume that the network structure is fixed. The key question is therefore how to distribute between players the value generated by a dynamic network. Jackson (2005a) introduced a new class of allocation rules that take into account the potential alternative constructions of the network, by assuming that the efficient network will eventually emerge. He considered the so called player-based flexible network allocation rule and the link-based flexible network allocation rule. However, in the approach used in Jackson (2005a) , even if the allocation is being decided upon when the network is formed or can still be changed, the framework is still static, since the dynamics is just introduced in the fictive construction/decomposition of the structure.
Summary of the paper
In this paper, we put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. For a similar approach but used for coalition processes, see Grabisch (2012, 2013) . We study time-series of networks that describe processes of network formation where several players or links may appear or disappear at any period. Convergence to one of the efficient networks does not necessarily need to be prescribed. One of the basic notions in our framework is the notion of a scenario of network formation processes which is simply a sequence of networks that are observed at subsequent time periods. We restrict our analysis to finite scenarios. A two-network sequence in a scenario is called a transition and is elementary if the two networks differ from each other only by one link. Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. A scenario allocation rule assigns to every value function a vector of allocations for every player and every scenario. In order to specify how the value generated by a dynamic process is distributed among players, an allocation rule for dynamic network processes is defined as an expected value over all possible scenarios of the scenario allocation rules. In the paper, we are interested in the perspective of assigning values to links rather than players, and consequently, our allocation rule is related to the link-based flexible network allocation rule by Jackson (2005a) . We introduce the link-based allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes, denoted as the LBD allocation rule. We focus on transitions, i.e., the LBD scenario allocation rule is equal to the sum of the transition allocation rules over the transitions that form the given scenario. The symmetric difference of two networks is the set of links where these networks differ. A player is inactive in a transition if he is not adjacent to the symmetric difference of the networks forming the transition. Otherwise, the player is active. For any elementary transition, the difference between the values generated by its new and old networks is divided equally between the two active players. Every inactive player gets zero. If the transition is not elementary, then we take the average over all possible shortest paths formed by elementary transitions of the given transition. We show that for a monotone game, the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) coincides with our allocation rule associated to the so called natural network formation process. In such a process, all scenarios are equally probable, we start with the empty network and add one link at each step until we get the complete network.
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the LBD scenario allocation rule which is based on a set of eight very natural axioms: concatenation, efficiency, inactive player, linearity for transitions, null link axiom, equal division, symmetry and antisymmetry for entering/leaving links. The concatenation axiom says that a scenario allocation rule of the concatenation of two concatenable scenarios (i.e., two sequences such that the last network of the one scenario is equal to the first network of the other scenario) is equal to the sum of scenario allocation rules of the two concatenable scenarios. Efficiency means that for any finite scenario, the sum of the scenario allocations for all players is equal to the difference between the values generated by the last and the first network that form the given scenario. Our two next axioms say that an inactive player in a transition gets always zero, and that the transition allocation rule is a linear operator for any transition. A link is null for a value function if adding that link to any network not containing that link does not change the value. According to the null link axiom, if in a transition all links in the symmetric difference to which a player is adjacent are null, then this player gets zero. According to the equal division axiom, in a transition where only one link which appears (resp., disappears) is nonnull and is not adjacent to any nonnull disappearing (resp., appearing) link, the two players forming that link get the same allocation. The symmetry axiom concerns only players in the same situation: either they have some new links (i.e., they are adjacent to some entering links) or they lose some links (they are adjacent to some leaving links). Players having both entering and leaving links are not concerned. Also, null links count for nothing. Suppose then that all entering nonnull links are symmetric (i.e., they have the same marginal contribution). Then the symmetry axiom says that each player receives an amount proportional to the number of links he is adjacent. Two distinct links are antisymmetric for a value function if adding them both to any graph not containing these links does not change the value. The antisymmetry for entering/leaving links says that if all pairs of entering links are symmetric (similarly for all pairs of leaving links), and if there exists an entering link and a leaving link which are antisymmetric, then every player gets an amount proportional to the number of links he is adjacent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recapitulate basic concepts on networks that will be used in the paper. In Section 3 our framework and the link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes are introduced. In 4 we establish the axiomatic characterization for this new allocation rule. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks and Section 6 contains proofs of the main results.
Preliminaries on networks and allocation rules
In this section we recall some preliminaries and standard notations concerning networks and allocation rules. Some notations related exclusively to our dynamic model will be introduced in the next section.
Consider a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} connected in some network relationship. A network is a set of pairs ij of players 1 with i, j ∈ N, i = j, 2 where ij ∈ N indicates the presence of a link between players i and j. Networks under consideration are undirected.
Two particular network relationships among players in N are easily identified: the empty network g ∅ without any link between players, and the complete network g N which is the set of all possible subsets of N of size 2. Let G be the set of all possible network relationships among players in N, i.e., G = {g|g ⊆ g N }. 3 We use the following standard set operations
For convenience we use the shorthand notation ij for the pair {i, j}. 2 Loop ii is not a possibility in this setting. 3 Since N is fixed, in order to simplify the notation, we will use G instead of G(N ).
g \ g ′ = {ij | ij ∈ g and ij / ∈ g ′ } By g + ij we denote the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g. Similarly, g − ij is the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g. For two networks g and g ′ , g∆g ′ denotes the symmetric difference, which is the set of links where g and g ′ differ, i.e.,
Let L i (g) denote the set of links that player i is involved in, and let ℓ(g) be the total number of links in g, i.e.,
A value function on networks is a mapping v : G → R, assigning a real number to any network. This could be for example the benefit or some worth generated by the network. For simplicity, we denote v({ij}) and v({ij, . . . , kl}) by v(ij) and v(ij, . . . , kl), respectively. Usually, a pair (N, v) consisting of a player set N and a value function v ∈ V is called a network game. We denote by V (N) the set of all possible value functions on
Adding links to a network is not detrimental to the value.
Given a value function v ∈ V , the monotonic cover of v is the value functionv such thatv(g) = max g ′ ⊆g v(g ′ ). The idea is that the players in a given network g may use the available links in any way they want in order to maximize the value generated. Note that v is monotonic if and only if v =v.
An important example of (monotonic) value functions are unanimity games. For any network g ∈ G, its associated unanimity game u g is defined by
As for TU-games, unanimity games form a basis of the set of network games for a fixed N (simply because the set of links plays exactly the rôle of N).
An allocation rule for a network game (N, v) specifies how the value generated by any network g is allocated among players. Specifically, an allocation rule is a function Jackson (2005a) proposes, in particular, the player-based flexible network allocation rule and the link-based flexible network allocation rule. Consider any v ∈ V and a network g ∈ G. The link-based flexible network allocation rule is defined by Note that if g is efficient, then v(g) =v(g) =v(g N ). Hence the normalization factor v(g) v(g N ) disappears.
Let us make some comments about this rule, which will motivate the construction of our new rule. As far as we know, the LBFN rule is one of the few examples of an allocation rule trying to take into account some dynamics of the network formation. It is called "flexible" because it is considered that the network g under consideration, which is not necessarily efficient, should evolve towards some efficient network. However, note that the way this evolution is realized is ignored by the rule, as well as the true final efficient network, which is not necessarily g N . Also, remark that g itself appears in the formula only as a normalization factor, but not directly in the computation. Lastly, we observe that it isv instead of v which is used in the formula. However, infinitely many games have the same monotonic cover, hence the information conveyed by v is partially ignored in the computation.
Based on these observations, we would like to propose an allocation rule which assumes that the network is not fixed and does not suppose that eventually the complete network or an efficient network will form. Rather, we consider that the evolution is free. Second, this rule should take fully into account the information contained in v, as well as the evolution of the network from the beginning to the end. As a conclusion, instead of
where U is a Markov chain or some stochastic process ruling the evolution of the network. This motivates the construction we propose in the following sections.
3 Markovian network processes
Description of the dynamic network process
We model a stochastic dynamic process of network formation, where at each discrete period of time a network is identified with some probability. One may think of a random meeting process where players randomly bump into each other in a pairwise fashion at each discrete period of time. In this setting, we view the formation of networks as a process that evolves over discrete time. A scenario of network formation process is a sequence of networks G = g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , g 3 . . .
with g t ∈ G for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . with the meaning that g t is the network observed at time period t. Note that a given network may appear several times in a sequence. A special case of scenario, called a normal scenario, is the one in which g 0 = g ∅ . A scenario is finite if the process eventually stops after a finite number of periods or converges to a given network, i.e., if there is T ∈ N such that g t = g T for each t ≥ T . In this paper, we focus on finite scenarios, and by S we denote the set of all finite scenarios. For a discussion of a possibility to consider infinite scenarios in Markovian coalition processes, see Faigle and Grabisch (2012) . Any two-element subsequence g, g ′ in G is called a transition and will be denoted by g → g ′ . A transition g → g ′ is elementary if g ′ differs from g only by one link.
Example 1 Consider a small group consisting of 3 researchers in a lab: Agnieszka (A), Jean-François (J) and Michel (M), i.e., we have N = {A, J, M}. The lab wants to promote collaboration among its members by announcing regular calls for 2-person projects. A link between any two researchers means submitting a project by these two researchers for getting a grant. An example of a normal finite scenario is
where each network appearing in this scenario corresponds to the set of the projects submitted for a given call. Consequently, in the scenario G, first Agnieszka and Michel decide to submit a project, but they do not resubmit anything for the next call, where two other projects are submitted: one by Agnieszka and Jean-François, and another one by Jean-François and Michel. Then, at the next call, every pair submits a project. Next, only Agnieszka and Michel submit a project, and finally for the last call, Agnieszka and Jean-François as well as Agnieszka and Michel submit two projects.
In the scenario G, three transitions are elementary, i.e.,
and the remaining two transitions are not elementary, i.e.,
{AM} → {AJ, JM}, g N → {AM}
A value function v can be defined, where v(g) depends on the CV's of the researchers involved and the quality of their cooperation. An allocation rule considering v and G would define a reward to individual researchers, for their involvement in enhancing cooperation in the lab over a certain period. We can assume that v(g ∅ ) = 0.
We assume that the probability of transition from one network to another depends only on the current period, and not on the whole history of transitions. Consequently, a scenario is ruled by a Markov chain with G as the set of states. If the scenario has attained a network g at period t, then the probability to observe a network g ′ in period t + 1, i.e., the probability of transition g → g ′ is given by u t gg ′ . We consider stationary Markov processes whose transition probabilities u t gg ′ are independent on t and denote them simply by u gg ′ . The transition matrix is therefore given by
The matrix U is row-stochastic, i.e., u gg ′ ≥ 0 and g ′ ∈G u gg ′ = 1 for each g ∈ G.
If G = g 0 , g 1 , g 2 . . . g T is a finite normal scenario with the transition matrix U, then the probability Pr(G) of occurrence of scenario G is given by
where Pr(g 0 ) is the probability of occurrence of the initial state g 0 . With a given transition matrix U we associate its directed transition graph Γ whose vertices are elements g ∈ G, and there is a directed edge from g to g ′ in Γ if and only if u gg ′ > 0 in U. 
The link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes
Next, we will introduce our allocation rule for the dynamic network process described above. First, we start with general definitions.
Definition 1 Let V be the set of value functions and S be the set of scenarios. A scenario allocation rule is a mapping ψ : V → R n×|S| , with components of ψ(v) denoted by ψ G i for player i and scenario G.
Definition 2 An allocation rule for dynamic network processes is a mapping Ψ : V → R n defined as the expected value over all possible scenarios of the scenario allocation rules, i.e.,
where Pr(G) is the probability of occurrence of scenario G.
We introduce and characterize the so-called link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes, denoted by Φ and abbreviated by the LBD (allocation) rule (LBD = link-based dynamic). Accordingly, φ G denotes the LBD scenario allocation rule.
We focus on transitions and study the properties of the following allocation rule:
-If the transition g → g ′ is elementary (i.e., g ′ differs from g only by one link, say ij), then
and for all other players φ g→g ′ k = 0. -If the transition is not elementary, we take the average over all possible shortest paths formed of elementary transitions from g to g ′ .
We introduce some additional concepts and notations.
Definition 3 A player i is adjacent to graph g if he is adjacent to some link in g, i.e., there exists j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g. We denote it by i ⇀ g or g ↼ i. Similarly, a link ij is adjacent to a graph g if either i ⇀ g or j ⇀ g. We denote it by ij ⇀ g or g ↼ ij.
In order to obtain compact formulations, we introduce the signed version of links and set of links. Considering a transition g → g ′ , entering links λ ∈ g ′ \ g have a positive sign, while leaving links have a negative sign. The signed version of a link λ is denoted by ελ, with ε = − or + depending whether λ is leaving or entering. Similarly, if h is a set of links (graph), εh is the set of signed links 4 . As a consequence, writing g + εij means g + ij if ε = + (entering) and g − ij if ε = − (leaving). Similarly, g + εh stands for the less readable (g ∪ h + ) \ h − with h + (resp. h − ) the set of entering (resp. leaving) links in h. Note that the "+" operation acts like the usual addition, e.g., g + ij − ij = g, except that it is idempotent:
In summary, entering and leaving links form the set g∆g ′ , which could be called the set of active links in transition g → g ′ . Accordingly, one can define active players.
Definition 4 A player i is said to be active in a transition g → g ′ if he is adjacent to g∆g ′ (in symbols: i ⇀ g∆g ′ ), otherwise i is said to be inactive in the transition g → g ′ .
Under these conventions we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 5 The link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes (the LBD allocation rule) Φ is defined as
and φ G is the LBD scenario allocation rule given by
with G = g 0 , g 1 , g 2 . . . g T and
where σ is any permutation on the set of links g∆g ′ = {λ 1 , . . . , λ |g∆g ′ | }, and h ik σ is the first set in the sequence {λ σ(1) }, {λ σ(1) , λ σ(2) }, . . . , g∆g ′ containing ik.
Note that inactive players receive 0.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the two levels (the allocation rule level and the scenario allocation rule level) work independently. That is, on the allocation rule level, the transitions between networks obey a Markov chain, which determines the probability of transitions of a network g into another network g ′ . This stochastic process typically results of the noncooperative behavior of the players, trying to maximize their own utility function. In a sense, it comes from the players taken as individuals. By contrast, on the scenario rule level, for a given transition g → g ′ , one has to define in a proper way how the benefit/loss of the transition (i.e., v(g ′ ) − v(g)) is shared among the players who are active in the transition. This could be seen as a basic rule imposed by the "network", i.e., by the players considered as a society, and which therefore operates on a different level. If one imposes symmetry in the sharing (no player has a special advantage, only v and the structure of the network matter), our axiomatization shows that we are led to compute, for a nonelementary transition, the (unweighted) average over all possibilities of starting from g and arriving at g ′ by elementary transitions, regardless of the probabilities of those elementary transitions stemming from the Markov chain.
Example 2 Consider the scenario G given in Example 1. By virtue of (4), we have
The symmetric differences and players adjacent to them are the following: 
In a similar way we can calculate φ
Note that for our scenario G we have φ G
In the next section we will show that the LBD scenario allocation rule is indeed efficient.
A first remarkable result is that we can recover the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) by considering a special process, called the natural process.
Definition 6
The natural process is a process of network formation defined by:
-the process starts with the empty network, i.e., g 0 = g ∅ -we add one link at each step until we obtain the complete graph g N -all scenarios are equally probable, i.e., Pr(G) = 1 η! for each G ∈ S, where η = n 2 .
Proposition 1 Assume v is a monotone game. Then for g = g N , the Y LBF N rule coincides with Φ associated to the natural process.
Proof: When v is monotone, the Y LBF N rule reduces to
Take player i and count his contribution ∆ i in each scenario. Consider scenario G. Since g N is complete, player i has degree n − 1, and therefore ∆ i is non null in exactly n − 1 transitions of the scenario where links ij are added, j = 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n. When the link ij is added, we find
where g ′ is the last graph without ij in G. For a fixed g ′ , there are ℓ(g ′ )! paths from the empty graph to g ′ , and (η − ℓ(g ′ ) − 1)! paths from g ′ + ij to the complete graph g N , hence the result.
Axiomatization of the LBD scenario allocation rule
Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the LBD scenario allocation rule. As introduced in Definition 1, ψ G denotes a scenario allocation rule for scenario G. In Section 1 we have already introduced the meaning of the axioms that characterize the LBD scenario allocation rule. In this section, we provide the formal descriptions of these axioms.
Definition 7 Two sequences G = g 0 , . . . , g q , G ′ = g ′ 0 , . . . , g ′ r are said to be concatenable if g q = g ′ 0 , in which case their concatenation is the sequence G ⊕ G ′ := g 0 , . . . , g q , g ′ 1 , . . . , g ′ r .
Concatenation (C): Let G, G ′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
Axiom (C) allows to restrict our attention to transitions. Indeed,
holds for every sequence G = g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g T .
Efficiency (E): For any finite scenario G = g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g T it holds
Linearity for transitions (L): v → ψ g→g ′ (v) is a linear operator for any transition g → g ′ .
Null link axiom (NL): If in a transition g → g ′ all links in g∆g ′ to which player i is adjacent are null for v, then ψ g→g ′ i (v) = 0.
For any graph g and game v, the graph g * is the graph where all links which are null for v have been deleted. This notation is used in the following axioms.
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Definition 9 Two distinct links ij, kl are symmetric for v if for every graph g not containing them, it holds v(g + ij) = v(g + kl).
Symmetry (S):
Consider the transition g → g ′ and a game v. If all links in (g\g ′ ) * (resp., (g ′ \ g) * ) are symmetric for v (assuming there are at least two symmetric links), then for all i ⇀
where ∼ means "proportional".
Remark 2 The (NL), (ED) and (S) axioms can be combined into a single one. Indeed, if all null links are discarded, a player satisfying the conditions of the (NL) axiom (i.e., all adjacent links in g∆g ′ are null) has degree 0 in (g∆g ′ ) * . Now, if only one link ij is nonnull in g \ g ′ and not adjacent to nonnull links in g ′ \ g, the degrees of i and j are equal to 1, hence they receive the same. One could call it the degree axiom (D) and it would read:
Degree axiom (D): Consider the transition g → g ′ , a game v and the graph (g∆g ′ ) * . If for all distinct links λ, λ ′ ∈ (g \ g ′ ) * (resp., (g ′ \ g) * ), λ and λ ′ are symmetric, then for all i ⇀
Definition 10 Two distinct links ij, kl are antisymmetric for v if v(g + ij + kl) = v(g) for every graph g not containing them.
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving links (ASEL): Consider the transition g → g ′ , a game v and the graph (g∆g ′ ) * . If all pairs of distinct links in (g \ g ′ ) * and in (g ′ \ g) * are symmetric for v, and if there exists a pair of links λ ∈ (g \ g ′ ) * , λ ′ ∈ (g ′ \ g) * which are antisymmetric for v, then for all i ⇀ (g∆g ′ ) * ,
Antisymmetric links have a counterbalancing effect, in the sense that they annihilate each other when entering together a network, which can be interpreted by saying that they bring the same contribution but of opposite sign. Therefore, if one is leaving and the other entering, their contribution in the scenario becomes equal and of the same sign. A characterization of asymmetric links can be obtained directly from the corresponding result for TU-games. We find:
Lemma 1 Distinct links λ, λ ′ are antisymmetric for v if and only if
where m v is the Möbius transform of v.
Similarly we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Distinct links λ, λ ′ are symmetric for v if and only if they are symmetric for m v :
Continuing the process we find the desired result.
Corollary 1 Suppose λ, λ ′ are antisymmetric for v, and that λ, λ ′′ are symmetric for v. Then λ ′ , λ ′′ are antisymmetric for v.
This shows that in the situation described by axiom (ASEL), any entering link is antisymmetric with any leaving link.
Proposition 2 The LBD scenario allocation rule satisfies (C), (E), (IP), (L), (NL), (ED), (S) and (ASEL).
For the proof, see the Appendix. For the proof, we use the following lemma. Proof: (i) Take ij ∈ h. Then ij is nonnull since u h (h) = u h (h − ij). Conversely, take ij ∈ h. Then u h (g) = u h (g − ij) for every g.
(ii) Assume |h| ≥ 2 and consider ij, kl ∈ h two distinct links. Then for any g not containing them, u h (g + ij) = u h (g + kl) = 0. Now assume |g N \ h| ≥ 2 and consider ij, kl ∈ h two distinct links. Then for any g not containing them, u h (g +ij) = u h (g +kl) = u h (g). Conversely, for h = g N , take ij ∈ h and kl ∈ h. Then 1 = u h (h − ij + ij) = u h (h − ij + kl) = 0, hence these links are not symmetric.
For the proof of Theorem 1, see the Appendix.
We have considered the dynamic random network formation processes, where links may appear and disappear at any time, and a scenario of the process, i.e., a sequence of networks, forms a Markov chain. We have established the characterization of the scenario allocation rule for dynamic network processes based on the set of natural axioms. We have shown that if a monotone game is considered, then the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) coincides with our LBD link-based allocation rule associated to the natural process.
Our framework of dynamic network formation can naturally model situations with the set of active players changing over time, where individuals appear or disappear during the process: some players may become involved in later periods of the network formation process, some others can be 'active' all the time, some individuals may appear only for a short period of time and disappear forever, or appear again after some time of "silence", etc. When allocating value generated by the dynamic networks we take into account all players that were ever involved in the dynamic network formation process. Hence, many real-life dynamic interactions with appearing/disappearing actors can naturally be modeled by our framework.
There are several directions for follow-up research on this subject. While we have presented the LBD allocation rule which is 'fair' in the sense that it is symmetric, we could consider a weighted version of the rule by introducing additionally weights to players when allocating the value among them. For instance, in our Example 1, a rule to reward researchers' involvement in enhancing cooperation could violate symmetry, by taking into account the individuals' frequency of professional missions or their needs for more sophisticated research equipments. Another extension of the present work could include a strategic version of the framework and an endogenous model of a stochastic network formation process.
Appendix -Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2 (C) is immediate from (4). (IP), (L) and (NL) are immediate from (5).
(E): By concatenation, it suffices to prove the result for transitions. Consider an elementary transition g → g ′ , with link ij added or deleted. Then
Now, suppose that the transition is not elementary, with η created/deleted links. Along each of the η! paths from g to g ′ , efficiency holds, therefore
(S): Let us consider that either |g \ g ′ | ≥ 2 or |g ′ \ g| ≥ 2.
1. We begin by showing that all null links can be discarded without change: φ g→g ′ (v) = φ g→g ′ \ij (v) if ij ∈ g ′ \ g is null for v (a similar reasoning holds for ij ∈ g \ g ′ ). Take such a link ij. We have by (5)
with notation of (5).
Since ij is null, the first term in the above equation vanishes. For the second term, we have
). In summary we get
2. We suppose now that no null link exists in g∆g ′ and that |g ′ \ g| ≥ 2, with all links in g ′ \ g being symmetric. By symmetry we can set ν 0 (h) = v(g − h), ν 1 (h) = v(g − h + ij), ν 2 (h) = v(g − h + ij + kl), . . . , ν |g ′ \g| (h) = v(g ′ − h), with ij, kl, . . . ∈ g ′ \ g, and h a set of links in g \ g ′ . Then for any i such that i ⇀ g ′ \ g and i ⇀ g \ g ′ , we get
where σ h − ,h + is any permutation putting first links in h − ∪ h + in any order. Observe that
is constant for every ik ∈ g ′ \ g. Therefore
the desired result.
(ED): similar to (S). In the case of (ED), we have h + = ∅ in the above equations, and letting (g ′ \ g) * = {ij}, the degrees of i and j are equal to 1.
(ASEL): Consider that links in (g \ g ′ ) * and in (g ′ \ g) * are symmetric for v, and that any two links λ ∈ (g \ g ′ ) * , λ ′ ∈ (g ′ \ g) * are antisymmetric for v. Take i, j ∈ N such that (g \ g ′ ) * ↼ i ⇀ (g ′ \ g) * , and (g ′ \ g) * ↼ j ⇀ (g \ g ′ ) * . We have by (5):
which we rewrite simply as
Let us prove that φ g→g ′ i,ik (v) = φ g→g ′ j,jℓ (v) using the fact that ik and jℓ are antisymmetric for v, that is, v(g ′′ + ik) = v(g ′′ − jℓ) for every graph jℓ ∈ g ′′ ∋ ik:
After a slight rewriting of φ g→g ′ i,ik (v):
(iii) If |h ∩ (g ′ \ g)| > 1, by Lemma 3, all links in h ∩ (g ′ \ g) are symmetric. Hence by (S), we find for any player i adjacent to (g ′ \ g) * = h ∩ (g ′ \ g):
and the others receive 0.
Finally,
Combining the above results and (9), ψ g→g ′ (u h ) is uniquely determined.
2. The case g ′ ⊆ g proceeds similarly.
3. We suppose g \ g ′ = ∅ and g ′ \ g = ∅. Observe that
otherwise.
3.1. Suppose h ⊆ g ′ and h ⊆ g ∩ g ′ , hence h ∩ (g∆g ′ ) = ∅ and h ∩ (g∆g ′ ) = h ∩ (g ′ \ g). Using (7), we can proceed as in case 1:
(ii) If |h ∩ (g ′ \ g)| > 1, we find for any player i adjacent to (g ′ \ g) * = h ∩ (g∆g ′ ):
3.2. The case h ⊆ g and h ⊆ g ∩ g ′ proceeds similarly and yields
3.3 Suppose h ⊆ g ∩ g ′ . Then all links in g∆g ′ are null, hence
3.4 Suppose h ⊆ g and h ⊆ g ′ . Equation (7) becomes: 
3.4.2. The case h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) = ∅ proceeds similarly, and we also find (15). 3.4.3 Suppose h ∩ (g ′ \ g) = ∅ and h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) = ∅. We proceed by induction on |h ∩ (g ′ \ g)|.
We consider first that h ∩ (g ′ \ g) = {ij} and the game v = u h − u h−ij . Applying Lemma 1, it is easy to check that ij and kℓ are antisymmetric for v, for any kℓ ∈ h∩(g\g ′ ). Also, all links in h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) are symmetric for v when there are at least two links. Then it follows from (ASEL) that
which by linearity (L) turns into
.
Since (h − ij) ∩ (g ′ \ g) = ∅, we are back to case 3.4.1., hence ψ g→g ′ (u h−ij ) = 0 and we obtain
Now, consider again equation (14). Observe that ψ g→g ′ i (u h ), ψ g→g ′ j (u h ), ψ g→g ′ k (u h ) and ψ g→g ′ ℓ (u h ) are variables in this equation. Moreover, we can apply (S) or (ED) to the nodes i ′ in the second term (those adjacent to h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) but not to h ∩ (g ′ \ g)), while the first and third term can only concern i or j or both. It follows that (14) 
We claim that any ij ∈ h ∩ (g ′ \ g) and any kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) are antisymmetric for v, and that moreover all ij ∈ h ∩ (g ′ \ g) are symmetric for v, and so are all links in h ∩ (g \ g ′ ).
22
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2013.63 Proof of the Claim: The values of the Möbius transform of v are 1 for h, −1 for h−ij, 1 for h−ij −i ′ j ′ , −1 for h−ij −i ′ j ′ −i ′′ j ′′ , etc., with ij, i ′ j ′ , i ′′ j ′′ ∈ h∩(g ′ \g), and 0 otherwise. Let us check antisymmetry for ij ∈ h ∩ (g ′ \ g) and kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) by Lemma 1. We must check that
Observe that m v (g + ij) = 0 for every g ∋ ij, kℓ. By construction either m v (g + ij + kl) and m v (g + kℓ) are both 0 (if g = h − h ′ − kℓ for some h ′ ⊆ h ∩ (g ′ \ g) containing ij), or m v (g + ij + kℓ) = −m v (g + kℓ) holds. In both cases, the equality holds. Now, by Lemma 2, symmetry holds for any two links in h ∩ (g ′ \ g) if m v is symmetric for these links, which is the case by construction. Finally, any two links in h ∩ (g \ g ′ ) are symmetric for v because they are symmetric for each u h−h ′ , h ′ ⊆ h ∩ (g \ g ′ ).
Hence (ASEL) can be applied to any pair of links ij ∈ h ∩ (g ′ \ g) and kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g ′ ), and since by induction hypothesis, all ψ g→g ′ (u h−h ′ ), h ′ = ∅ are determined, it follows that (16) holds, for any ij ∈ h ∩ (g ′ \ g) and any kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g ′ ). Finally, the successive substitutions into (14) determine ψ g→g ′ (u h ) uniquely.
